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I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of new communication technologies has brought with it the classic
struggle of who should regulate its content. Should the industry, the market, or the
government regulate such content? Perhaps no one should. Various anti-indecency
media groups have voiced their concern about wireless adult content.1 Some groups
suggest a complete ban of adult content on wireless devices, while others suggest the
regulation of wireless content via the indecency standards of traditional radio or
television broadcasting.2
One group, Morality in Media, Inc., has recommended in its formal Comment3 to
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) that if the FCC chooses to allow
cell phone use on commercial flights, a “smoking section” or something with a
similar effect should be established to protect passengers from unwanted content.4
This idea conjures up the bygone era of when the airlines permitted in-flight
smoking. The proposal of a cell phone section for airline flights may provide the
specter of regulation, but most likely, it will be as effective in protecting passengers
from adult images as smoking sections were in protecting non-smoking passengers
from secondhand smoke.5
Some commentators believe the regulation of wireless content on airplanes is just
a disguised attempt to press the FCC into regulating all wireless content.6 The main
agenda of these anti-indecency media groups is to rid the airwaves, including cable
and satellite, of all forms of so-called indecency.7 If these groups are successful in
creating a ban on wireless adult content on airplanes, then this precedent creates an
opportunity to extend the ban beyond the airline setting. If that attempt is successful,
then the ban could extend to other technologies that are currently protected from
government regulation. The patent core issue is whether the scope of the FCC’s
regulatory authority extends to the content of wireless broadband transmissions.
1

See Mark Rockwell, Buckle Up, There’s Rough Air Ahead, WIRELESS WEEK, Sept. 1,
2005 at 12.
2

Id.

3

Letter from Paul J. McGeady, Attorney, Morality in Media, to FCC (May 26, 2005),
available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch_v2.cgi (enter Morality in Media in the
"filed on behalf of" field, then enter 5/26/2005 in the "search by specific date" field).
4

Id. at 9.

5

See SecondHand Smoke: Unsafe in Any Amount, HARV. MED. SCH. FAM. HEALTH GUIDE,
Nov. 2004, http://www.health.harvard.edu/fhg/updates/update1104c.shtml.
6

See Rockwell, supra note 1.

7

See, e.g., American Family Association, http://www.afa.net/pornography/internet.asp
(last visited Sept. 4, 2007); Morality in Media, Inc., http://www.moralityinmedia.org (follow
“Radio/TV Indecency” hyperlink)(last visited Sept. 4, 2007); Parents Television Council,
http://www.parentstv.org (follow “Current Campaigns” hyperlink, then follow “Broadcast
Indecency” hyperlink)(last visited Sept. 4, 2007).
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The Communications Act of 1934 (Communications Act) established the FCC as
the authority to regulate wired and wireless communications in the United States.8
Since 1934, the FCC and the technologies it regulates have changed dramatically.9
Specifically, the regulation of broadcast indecency and obscenity has certainly seen
significant changes over the years.10 Title 18 of the United States Code, Section
1464 prohibits obscene or indecent speech by means of radio communication.11 The
question then becomes: Do broadband transmissions to wireless devices constitute
radio communication that may be regulated by the FCC under § 1464?
The FCC has used § 1464 to enforce broadcast indecency of radio and television
in landmark cases resolved by the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit and by the United States Supreme Court.12 In these cases, the courts
established tests to determine indecency and what broadcast media the government
may regulate.13 In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National
Committee, Chief Justice Burger recognized the difficulties of regulating broadcast
content when he wrote: “The problems of regulation are rendered more difficult
because the broadcast industry is dynamic in terms of technological change;
solutions adequate a decade ago are not necessarily so now, and those acceptable
today may well be outmoded 10 years hence.”14 Wireless devices have evolved
beyond the grasp of § 1464 and the FCC authority, leaving any attempt to regulate
the content of wireless devices inadequate and precisely outmoded. The wished-for
regulation of wireless content transmissions exceeds the boundaries of the FCC’s
regulatory authority; therefore, the FCC regulations proposed by the anti-indecency
8

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).

9

Policing indecent content has proved to be more challenging as methods of
communication evolve. Radio and television continue to be the media most highly regulated
by the FCC, whereas the Internet has escaped the indecency parameters of the traditional
forms of broadcast. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)(holding law prohibiting
transmission of indecent or patently offensive material to persons under 18 unconstitutional).
10

In the past, the typical complaint received by the FCC dealt with indecent language aired
on a radio or television broadcast. In addition to those typical complaints, the FCC now must
deal with televised nudity and partial nudity, radio shock jocks, Internet pornography, and so
forth. One dramatic change is the organized complaint filing effort of a few anti-indecency
media groups. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Using the Internet, these groups communicate
more efficiently with their members and are able to blitz the FCC with hundreds of thousands
of complaints a year. See Jerry Del Colliano, Report Says Nearly All FCC Indecency
Complaints From Same Organization, AUDIO VIDEO REVOLUTION, Jan. 6, 2005,
http://www.avrev.com/news/0105/6.indecency.html. This high level of organization allows
these groups to target one specific show or incident if they so desire. Some argue that these
groups wield a significant amount of influence over FCC policy and have placed indecency
issues in the national spotlight. Id.
11

18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).

12

See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Action for Children’s Television
v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Act III); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932
F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Act II); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (Act I).
13

See cases cited supra note 12.

14

Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102 (1973).
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media groups to regulate wireless content create a slippery slope on which the First
Amendment rights of all forms of communication transmissions may fall.
This Note will argue that the scope of the FCC’s authority to regulate traditional
broadcast content does not extend to the content transmitted to wireless devices via
broadband transmission. Part II of this Note provides a study of the key cases that
characterize the scope of the FCC’s statutory authority to regulate traditional
broadcast content. Additionally, Part II presents a discussion of the First
Amendment and the limits it imposes on the FCC’s regulation of broadcast content.
Part III evaluates whether content transmitted by new technologies fits into the
regulatory scope of the FCC’s authority according to the tests set forth in previous
United States Supreme Court cases. Part IV briefly discusses the influence of
politics on FCC policy. Finally, Part V presents the possible effects the regulation of
wireless content by the FCC will have on the rights of free speech and commerce in
the United States.
II. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF FCC AUTHORITY TO REGULATE INDECENCY
A. A History of Establishing FCC Statutory Authority
The rapid growth of radio communications in the early 1900s prompted the
United States government to adopt regulatory legislation, but all of these attempts
left some major issues unresolved; chiefly, the separation of control within the
government over radio communications.15 The Communications Act unified the
regulation of wired and wireless communications under one federal jurisdiction.16
The philosophical structure behind the Act stems from eight key assumptions of the
Radio Act of 1927.17 The eight defining assumptions of the Radio Act of 1927 are:
(1) The radio waves belong to the people.
(2) Licensees must serve the public.
(3) All of the public should receive benefits.
(4) Not all applicants are eligible to receive a license.
(5) Broadcasting has distinct features.
(6) Broadcast expression is protected by the First Amendment.
(7) The government maintains discretionary regulatory authority.
(8) Governmental authority is not absolute.18
Additionally, Section 1 of the Communications Act precisely states its purpose:
For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication by wire and radio so as to make available, so far as
possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient,
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national
defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through
15

See F. LESLIE SMITH, ET AL., ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND GOVERNMENT: THE REGULATION OF
WIRELESS AND WIRED MASS COMMUNICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 33-41 (1995).
16

47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).

17

SMITH, supra note 15, at 42-43.

18

Id.
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the use of wire and radio communication, and for the purpose of securing
a more effective execution of this policy by centralizing authority
heretofore granted by law to several agencies and by granting additional
authority with respect to interstate and foreign commerce in wire and
radio communication, there is created a commission to be known as the
“Federal Communications Commission,” which shall be constituted as
hereinafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions
of this [chapter].19
This combination of philosophy and purpose remains the fundamental framework
for the regulation of broadcasting in the United States.20 With the power now
granted to the FCC by Congress, the FCC may regulate the broadcast content of
radio and television transmissions.21
To begin a study of content regulation by the FCC, obscenity must be
distinguished from indecency. In Miller v. California, the Supreme Court
established three elements that must be satisfied for content to qualify as obscene:
(a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community
standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest . . .
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value.22
If the content satisfies all three prongs of the Miller test, then the First Amendment
does not protect the content if disseminated in any form.23 In broadcasting, the
distinction becomes unclear because § 1464 includes the words “obscene” and
“indecent” in its stated definition by punishing anyone who “utters any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication . . . .”24
During the 1960s and 1970s, the FCC made many early attempts to regulate and
define the term “indecent” so that a station would appeal to a federal court.25 In
1970, the FCC made a concerted effort for judicial review of what the FCC
19

§ 151.

20

SMITH, supra note 15, at 43.

21

The Act has had several major changes, most of which allowed for the growth of the
communications capabilities in the United States. Amendments to the Act have provided for
the growth of television, cable, and commercial satellite use. These amendments have been
necessary because the drafters of the original Act could not have prepared for the technologies
yet to be developed. SMITH, supra note 15, at 44-45.
22

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).

23

Id. at 36.

24

18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006).

25

KIMBERLY ZARKIN, ANTI-INDECENCY GROUPS AND THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION: A STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF BROADCAST REGULATION 36, 42 (2003).
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considered indecent broadcasting.26 One such attempt occurred when the FCC fined
a radio station for broadcasting a taped interview with Jerry Garcia, the front-man for
the rock band The Grateful Dead.27 The fine was in response to two four-letter
words that Garcia “frequently interspersed” in his comments during the interview.28
The FCC concluded that the speech was indecent by stating: “[T]he speech involved
has no redeeming social value, and is patently offensive by contemporary
community standards, with very serious consequences to the ‘public interest in the
larger and more effective use of radio [].’”29 The radio station paid the $100 fine
leaving the FCC claim of indecency unchallenged.30
It was not until the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation that the
Supreme Court cleared up this distinction of what constitutes broadcast indecency,
albeit very narrowly.31 On October 30, 1973, at about two o’clock in the afternoon, a
New York radio station, owned by Pacifica Foundation, aired a pre-recorded twelve
minute monologue by George Carlin entitled “Filthy Words.”32 The monologue
discussed the seven dirty words one could not say on the public airwaves.33 The
FCC received only one complaint regarding the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue.34
In response to the complaint, the FCC issued a declaratory order on February 12,
1975, finding the broadcast of Carlin’s monologue indecent.35 Additionally, the
order defined indecency as “language that describes, in terms patently offens[ive] as
26

In In re WUHY-FM, the FCC stated:
We believe that a most crucial peg underlying all Commission action in the
programming field is the vital consideration that the courts are there to review and
reverse any action which runs afoul of the First Amendment. Thus, while we think
that our action is fully consistent with the law, there should clearly be the avenue of
court review in a case of this nature []. Indeed, we would welcome such review, since
only in that way can the pertinent standards be definitively determined.
In re WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 415 (1970).
27

Id. at 408.

28

Id. at 409. Garcia used the words shit and fuck. Id.

29

Id. at 410 (citation omitted).

30

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 42 (citing Don M. Gilmore et al., The Regulation of Electronic
Media, in MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW: CASES AND COMMENT 825-28 (1990)).
31

See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).

32

Id. at 729-30.

33

Id. at 729. The seven dirty words, according to Carlin, are: shit, piss, fuck, cunt,
cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. GEORGE CARLIN, Filthy Words, on OCCUPATION: FOOLE
(Little David Records 1973).
34
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730. Interestingly,
[t]he complaint was made by a Florida resident who lived outside the range of the
station’s signal and who was a member of the national planning board of Morality in
Media. His “young son” who was with him in the car when he heard the monologue
was fifteen years old.
JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, BROADCAST INDECENCY: F.C.C. REGULATION AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 42 (1997).
35

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730, 732.
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measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual
or excretory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience.”36 The FCC did not issue a fine against
Pacifica but did place a copy of the order in the radio station’s file.37
With support from the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Pacifica sought
judicial review of the order by appealing to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit.38 The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the order represented
censorship prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 32639 or, alternatively, that the order was
unconstitutionally overbroad.40 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on an appeal
by the FCC.41
Written by Justice Stevens, the plurality opinion of the Court in Pacifica listed
four issues to be decided:
(1) whether the scope of judicial review encompasses more than the
Commission’s determination that the monologue was indecent “as broadcast”;
(2) whether the Commission’s order was a form of censorship forbidden
by § 326;
(3) whether the broadcast was indecent within the meaning of § 1464; and
(4) whether the order violates the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution.42
Justice Stevens answered the two statutory questions separately, albeit he
acknowledged the two provisions have a common origin.43 Therefore, this section of
the Note focuses on the statutory questions presented in issues (2) and (3), while the
following section discusses the First Amendment question presented in issue (4).
Pacifica argued that § 326, which prohibits the censorship of broadcasts by the
FCC,44 denied the FCC any power to censor its broadcast content.45 Justice Stevens
made it clear in his opinion that § 326 had “never been construed to deny the
Commission the power to review the content of completed broadcasts in the
36

In re Citizen’s Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI-FM, ,56 F.C.C.2d 94,
98 (1975).
37

Id. at 99.

38

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 45-46.

39

Section 326 provides:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
42 U.S.C. § 326 (2006).
40

Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 18 (1977).

41

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 47.

42

FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 734 (1978).

43

Id. at 735.

44

§ 326.

45

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 734.
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performance of its regulatory duties.”46 Justice Stevens cited numerous cases
decided by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that consistently agreed with
this construction of § 326.47 He reached this conclusion after stating that “[section]
326 does not limit the Commission’s authority to impose sanctions on licensees who
engage in obscene, indecent, or profane broadcasting.”48 After nullifying Pacifica’s
§ 326 censorship argument, Justice Stevens then dismissed the statutory question
surrounding § 1464.49
The FCC recognized that several words used in Carlin’s monologue fell squarely
within the FCC’s definition of indecency.50 Pacifica took issue with the FCC’s
definition of indecency, but agreed that the afternoon broadcast was patently
offensive.51 Pacifica’s position was that the broadcast was not indecent within the
meaning of § 1464 because of the absence of prurient appeal.52 Although Pacifica
built a strong argument, Justice Stevens rejected Pacifica’s construction of § 1464.53
Pacifica asserted that the Court, in previous decisions, “construed the term
‘indecent’ in related statutes to mean ‘obscene,’ as that term was defined in Miller.”54
Specifically, Pacifica referred to 18 U.S.C. § 146155 and the construction the Court
gave § 1461 in Hamling v. United States.56 Pacifica stressed the Court’s holding in
Hamling that a disjunctive phrase contained in § 1461 is limited to mean obscene;
therefore, the similar disjunctive phrase in § 1464 should also be limited to mean
obscene, thereby necessitating the element of a prurient appeal.57 With the absence
46

Id. at 735 (emphasis added).

47

See, e.g., Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith v. FCC, 403 F.2d 169, 173-74, n.3
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[C]anceling the license of a broadcaster who persists in a course of
improper programming . . . would not be prohibited censorship, . . . programs containing such
material are grounds for denial of a license renewal”)(internal quotation marks omitted);
KFKB Broad. Ass’n v. Fed. Radio Comm’n, 47 F.2d 670, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1931) (“[T]he
commission has merely exercised its undoubted right to take note of appellant’s past conduct,
which is not censorship”); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C.
Cir. 1969); Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. FCC, 352 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Bay State Beacon,
Inc. v. FCC, 171 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948).
48

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 738.

49

See id. at 738-41.

50

Id. at 739.

51

Id.

52

Id.

53

Id. at 741.

54

Id. at 740.

55

Section 1461 addresses “[e]very obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article,
matter, thing, device, or substance . . . .”
18 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006).
56

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740; see also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).

57

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-40.
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of the prurient appeal element, the Court could not deem the broadcast indecent
within the meaning of the statute.58
In response to Pacifica’s contentions, Justice Stevens interpreted the plain
language of § 1464.59 He concluded that because the phrase “obscene, indecent, or
profane”60 was written in the disjunctive, each word must have a separate meaning.61
He stated that “prurient appeal is an element of the obscene,” but described the term
indecent according to Webster’s dictionary as, “nonconformance with accepted
standards of morality.”62 Justice Stevens reasoned that Hamling’s construction of
§ 1461 did not relate to § 1464 by stating each statute applies to two different
media.63 He concluded by stating that “neither our prior decisions nor the language
or history of § 1464 supports the conclusion that prurient appeal is an essential
component of indecent language . . . . [Therefore], we reject Pacifica’s construction
of the statute.”64
After the Pacifica ruling, the FCC has the statutory authority and judicial
approval to pursue the regulation of indecency on the airwaves. The rule established
by Pacifica was apparent for broadcasters: Avoid the “seven dirty words” to
circumvent sanction by the FCC.65 Surprisingly, the FCC was virtually silent in their
mission to control broadcast indecency for the next ten years.66 The silence stopped
with the emergence of a new type of radio broadcaster known as the “shock jock.”67
Complaints flooded the FCC in response to this style of “innuendo-laden humor.”68
As a result, the FCC answered in 1987 with three crucial decisions pertaining to
indecency standards.69
In April 1987, the FCC issued warnings to three separate radio stations for
indecency violations.70 By doing so, the FCC put these three stations and the rest of
the broadcasting industry on notice of the new expansive reach of broadcast
58

Id. at 739-40.

59

Id. at 739.

60

§ 1464.

61

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-40.

62

Id. at 740.

63

Id. at 741 (“It is unrealistic to assume that Congress intended to impose precisely the
same limitations on the dissemination of patently offensive matter by such different means.”);
see also id. at 741 n.17.
64

Id. at 741.

65

SMITH, supra note 15, at 363.

66

Id.

67

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 49.

68

Id. (citing Julia Reed, Raunch ‘n’ Roll Radio is Here to Stay, US NEWS & WORLD
REPORT, May 4, 1987, at 52).
69

See In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698 (1987); In re Regents of U. of Cal., 2
F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); In re Infinity Broad., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987).
70

See sources cited supra note 69.
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indecency regulation.71 The three broadcast companies cited by the FCC to illustrate
the new policy of indecency regulation were the Pacifica Foundation, the Regents of
the University of California, and Infinity Broadcasting.72 The Pacifica “broadcast
[contained] excerpts from a critically acclaimed play called Jerker,” which depicted
a homosexual dying of AIDS and “included graphic descriptions of homosexual
encounters.”73 The Regents of the University of California broadcast played a song
called Makin’ Bacon by the Pork Dukes that contained lyrics with a “significant
amount of sexual innuendo.”74 The Infinity broadcast was the infamous Howard
Stern Show, which contained sexual “innuendo and double entendre.”75
The first order written by the FCC, which was against the Pacifica Foundation,
stated:
[W]e take this opportunity to state that, notwithstanding any prior contrary
indications, we will not apply the Pacifica standard so narrowly in the
future. We find that the definition of indecent broadcast material set forth
in Pacifica appropriately includes a broader range of material than the
seven specific words at issue in Pacifica. Those particular words are
more correctly treated as examples of, rather than a definitive list of, the
kinds of words that, when used in a patently offensive manner as
measured by contemporary community standards applicable to the
broadcast medium, constitute indecency.76
This statement broadened the scope of indecency regulation well beyond the “seven
dirty words” used by Carlin.77 The FCC was now focusing on the context of
broadcasts to determine if an indecency violation existed.78
Indecency regulation primarily consisted of FCC fines for the next decade and a
half.79 The period of “deregulation” had ended,80 and broadcasters paid most of the
fines imposed by the FCC.81 The various broadcast companies paid the fines not
71

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 49.

72

See sources cited supra note 69.

73

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 49 (See In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2700).

74

Id. (See In re Regents of the U. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703, 2703).

75

Id. (See In re Infinity Broad., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705, 2705 (1987). Howard Stern is the most
prominent target of the anti-indecency groups battle to rid the airwaves of indecency. Stern
has become the poster-child of indecency in America and he is portrayed as the example of
what is wrong with the content of broadcasting today. See sources cited supra note 7.
76

In re Pacifica Found., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699.

77

See textual comment supra note 33.

78

SMITH, supra note 15, at 363.

79
ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 55-60 (discussing various cases where fines ranging from
$2,000 to $600,000 were imposed).
80

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 55 (citing Caroline E. Mayer, FCC Curbs Radio, TV
Language; Agency Threatens Stations that are Sexually Explicit, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 1987,
at A1).
81

ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 59.
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because they agreed with the FCC’s determinations of indecency, but because of the
opportunity of deregulated business expansion granted in the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.82 The FCC and indecency became national topics of discussion with
the growth of the Internet, the airing of risqué television programs on cable, and
most notably, the “Janet Jackson incident.”83 The FCC’s statutory authority was no
longer the primary issue: The First Amendment right of free speech with respect to
broadcasting and new technologies came to the forefront of the debate.
B. The First Amendment and FCC Regulation
The FCC’s regulation of a medium of communication cannot exist if that
regulation violates the First Amendment. The First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech, or the press.”84 First Amendment protection is not so absolute. The Court
has upheld many laws prohibiting certain speech as constitutional.85 Content and
context are critical elements of First Amendment analysis, as Justice Holmes stated
in Schenck v. United States:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their
constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the
circumstances in which it is done. The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against
uttering words that may have all the effect of force. The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
82

Id. Howard Stern had accumulated over $1.7 million in fines owed to the FCC by
Infinity Broadcasting. Id. The CEO of Infinity, Mel Karmazin, vowed he would not pay the
fines, preferring instead to compel the FCC into court. Id. However, the chance to expand the
business proved too much and Infinity settled with the FCC by paying $1.71 million in fines in
exchange for a clean record. Id. Additionally, any indecency offenses committed in the future
would be treated as “first” offenses. Id. at 55-60. Howard Stern had the last laugh. After years
of combat with the FCC over indecency on terrestrial radio, Stern signed an extremely
lucrative deal with Sirius Satellite Radio. Stern began broadcasting his morning show in
January of 2006 without any oversight or censorship by the FCC. See generally Howard Stern
website, http://www.howardstern.com (last visited Jan. 6, 2007), see also Jacques Steinberg,
Howard Stern Prepares for Life Without Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2005, at E5.
83

FCC Chair Vows to Investigate Halftime Flash, MSNBC, Feb. 4, 2004,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4131637.
84

U.S. CONST. amend. I.

85

See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (observing the commonsense
differences between commercial speech and other types of speech); Young v. Am. Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (holding that a statutory classification is constitutional
when it is based on the content of communication protected by the First Amendment); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (treating libels against private citizens more severely
than libels against public officials); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that
obscenity receives no protection under the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942) (allowing the government to prohibit speech that is calculated to provoke
a physical fight).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

11

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

410

[Vol. 54:399

such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.86
The FCC’s authority stems directly from Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution.87 Among the listed powers granted to Congress in Article I, Section 8
is the power to regulate interstate commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause.88
According to the Supreme Court, the term “commerce” is construed very broadly
and includes electronic communications89 and deems all radio communication
interstate.90 Congress used this power to pass the Communications Act, which
created the FCC and gave it the authority to regulate radio and television
transmissions.91 The United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter in determining
if the rules and regulations promulgated by the FCC pass constitutional muster and,
specifically, if the rules violate the First Amendment.92
When the Court determines if a law prohibiting speech violates the First
Amendment, one aspect the Court considers is the invasiveness of the
communication to the listener.93 In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Court
applied the invasiveness test to determine the constitutionality of a city ordinance
prohibiting films containing nudity at drive-in theaters.94 In striking down the
ordinance as unconstitutional, Justice Powell wrote:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to shield
the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more
offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its power. Such
selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on
the privacy of the home, or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for
the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure. . . .
....
. . . [T]he Constitution does not permit government to decide which types
of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require
86

Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations omitted).

87

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.

88

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

89

Pensacola Tel. Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1, at *9 (1877).

90

Fed. Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933).

91

47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).

92

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

93

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (reasoning that “[c]ommunications
over the Internet do not invade an individual's home”); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744-45 (1996) (“Cable television systems, including
access channels, have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans.”); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
94

See Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 206, 211-12.
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protection for the unwilling listener or viewer . . . . [T]he burden normally
falls upon the viewer to “avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities
simply by averting [his] eyes.”95
The invasiveness of the communication proves to be a critical factor in
determining the constitutionality of a law prohibiting speech as it applies to different
media of communication.96 The Court continued to employ this test of invasiveness
to the medium of radio in its analysis of the First Amendment issue in Pacifica.97
In Pacifica, the Court described two predominant factors that provide for the
constitutional prohibition of speech in the broadcast medium: (1) the “uniquely
[established] pervasive presence” of the broadcast media, and (2) the “unique[]
accessib[ility]” of broadcasts to children.98 The first factor distinguished the medium
of broadcasting from other forms of speech99 and conferred to it the least amount of
First Amendment protection.100 Justice Stevens wrote: “Patently offensive, indecent
material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”101 Consequently, the invasive
character of broadcasting has allowed the FCC to regulate indecency on the radio
and television without violating the First Amendment.102
The second factor, which is frequently given as the driving force behind
indecency regulation,103 also limited the amount of First Amendment protection
afforded to broadcasting.104 In Pacifica, the Court recognized “the government’s
interest in the ‘well-being of its youth’ and in supporting ‘parents’ claim to authority
in their own household’ justified the regulation of otherwise protected expression.”105
Considering the “ease with which children may obtain access to broadcast material”
and the concerns stated above, the Court found ample justification for “special
treatment of indecent broadcasting.”106
Thus, the protection of a child’s
95
Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209-11 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)
(citations omitted)).
96

See cases cited supra note 93.

97

See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50.

98

Id. at 748-49.

99
For example, the print medium receives more First Amendment protection than does the
broadcast medium. Khaldoun Shobaki, Speech Restraints for Converged Media, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 333, 337-38 (2004).
100

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.

101

Id. (citing Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).

102

See generally Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; see also SMITH, supra note 15, at 46-47.

103

See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 12, 85, 93.

104

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 749.

105

Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)).

106

Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750. Pacifica’s narrowness is illustrated by the Court’s
determination that the prohibition of broadcast indecent speech is applicable only during times
when children are the likely listeners of a broadcast. Id. at 749-50.
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“psychological well-being”107 permits the FCC to regulate the indecency of
traditional broadcasts without violating the First Amendment, although “it must do
so by narrowly drawn regulations.”108
In Sable Communications of California v. FCC, the Court distinguished the
constitutionality of the prohibition of free speech as it applied to the protection of
children in Pacifica from the prohibition of speech at issue in Sable.109 In Sable, the
FCC banned all indecent and obscene interstate commercial telephone messages,
commonly known as “dial-a-porn,” under § 223(b) of the Communications Act. 110
The Court succinctly distinguished the FCC’s reliance on Pacifica as authority for
the prohibition of indecent telephone messages.111 First, the Court demonstrated that
Pacifica did not involve a total ban on broadcasting indecency, as does the regulation
in Sable.112 Second, the Court used a “medium-specific” approach to distinguish the
broadcast medium in Pacifica from the telephone pay service in Sable.113
In the latter approach, the Court concluded that the telephone communications at
issue in Sable “are substantially different from the public radio broadcast at issue in
Pacifica.”114 Justice White noted several important distinguishing features of the
dial-it medium: (1) “[T]he listener [must] take affirmative steps to receive the
communication”; (2) “[t]here is no ‘captive audience’” or unwilling listener; (3) “a
caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication”; and (4) “a telephone call is
not the same as turning on a radio.”115 Based upon this medium-specific approach,
the Court reaffirmed its position that “the government may not ‘reduce the adult
population . . . to . . . only what is fit for children.’”116 The Court held “there is no
constitutional stricture against Congress’ prohibiting the interstate transmission of
obscene commercial telephone recordings,”117 but concluded that “§ 223(b) was not
107

Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).

108

Id. (citations omitted). In furtherance of this view, Justice White stated, “It is not
enough to show that the government’s ends are compelling; the means must be carefully
tailored to achieve those ends.” Id.
109

Id. at 127-28.

110

Id. at 117-18.

111

Id. at 127.

112

Id.

113

Id. at 127-28.

114

Id. at 127.

115

Id. at 127-28.

116

Id. at 128. (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983) (quoting
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957))).
117

Sable, 492 U.S. at 125 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan, who concurred in Parts I, II
and IV of the majority opinion, strongly dissented with regard to the criminal prohibition of
obscene communication as it relates to the First Amendment. Id. at 133. Justice Brennan
stated in his dissent:
In my view, however, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(1)(A)'s parallel criminal prohibition with
regard to obscene commercial communications likewise violates the First
Amendment. I have long been convinced that the exaction of criminal penalties for
the distribution of obscene materials to consenting adults is constitutionally
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sufficiently narrowly drawn to serve that purpose [of prohibiting indecent messages]
and thus violated the First Amendment.”118
Similarly, the Court applied the medium-specific approach in Reno v. ACLU, in
which the Court distinguished new communication technologies from traditional
broadcasting. When regulating speech that occurs in traditional broadcasting media,
the Court will apply a lesser level of First Amendment scrutiny.119 At issue in Reno
was the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA) as it
applied to the Internet.120 In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens reiterated the
District Court’s finding that “the Internet is ‘a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication.’”121 Justice Stevens qualified this finding by
intolerable. In my judgment, “the concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with
sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice to persons who create and
distribute sexually oriented materials, to prevent substantial erosion of protected
speech as a byproduct of the attempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very
costly institutional harms.”
. . . [T]he federal parties cannot plausibly claim that their legitimate interest in
protecting children warrants this Draconian restriction on the First Amendment rights
of adults who seek to hear the messages that Sable and others provide.
Id. at 133-35(citation omitted).
118
Id. at 126 (emphasis added). The FCC continued to insist that without a total ban on
indecency under § 223(b), the government would not achieve its interest in protecting
children. Id. at 128-29. Sable contains an interesting passage whereby the Court politely
asserts its authority to decide constitutional issues over the insistence of the FCC that the
Court should defer to Congress’ conclusion:
To the extent that the federal parties suggest that we should defer to Congress’
conclusion about an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that while we do not
ignore it, it is our task in the end to decide whether Congress has violated the
Constitution. This is particularly true where the Legislature has concluded that its
product does not violate the First Amendment. Deference to a legislative finding
cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake.... The federal
parties, however, also urge us to defer to the factual findings by Congress relevant to
resolving the constitutional issue. Beyond the fact that whatever deference is due
legislative findings would not foreclose our independent judgment of the facts bearing
on an issue of constitutional law, our answer is that the congressional record contains
no legislative findings that would justify us in concluding that there is no
constitutionally acceptable less restrictive means, short of a total ban, to achieve the
Government’s interest in protecting minors.
Id. at 129 (citations & internal quotation marks omitted).
119

See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).

120

Id. at 859-62. In Reno, two provisions of the CDA were specifically challenged.
Section 223(a)(1)(B) criminalized the “knowing” transmission of “obscene or indecent”
messages to any recipient under the age of 18. Id. at 859. Section 223(d) prohibited the
“knowing” sending or displaying to a person under 18 of any message “that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” Id. at 859-60.
121

Reno, 521 U.S. at 850 (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
The Court noted that the District Court “made 410 findings, including 356 paragraphs of the
parties’ stipulation and 54 findings based on evidence received in open court.” Id. at 849 n.2.
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distinguishing the Internet and the CDA from the precedents discussed earlier in this
Note.122
First, the Court described significant differences between the holdings of Pacifica
and the CDA.123 The Court focused on the lengthy history of the FCC’s regulation of
radio broadcasts and that radio broadcast “warnings could not adequately protect the
listener from unexpected program content.”124 Justice Stevens reasoned that the
Internet “has no comparable history,” and the risk of accidental encounters with
indecent material are “remote because a series of affirmative steps is required to
access specific material” on the Internet.125 Thus, the precedent set forth in Pacifica
did not require the Court to uphold the CDA and allowed the Court to apply the
standard of strict scrutiny in reviewing the provisions of the CDA as they applied to
the First Amendment.126
Second, the Court distinguished the invasiveness of radio and television from the
Internet by relying upon the distinctions expressed in Sable.127 Based upon the
District Court’s findings that the Internet does not invade the home or computer
screen “by accident,” Justice Stevens pointedly stated: “[T]he Internet is not as
‘invasive’ as radio or television.”128 While Justice Stevens agreed with the
“compelling interest [of the government] in protecting the . . . psychological wellbeing of minors,” he did not sanction the government’s complete ban on speech
involving a different medium of communication from that of broadcasting.129 The
Court agreed with the District Court’s conclusion that “our cases provide no basis for
qualifying the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium.”130
Lastly, the Government asserted that its interest in the growth of the Internet
provided “an independent basis for upholding the constitutionality of the CDA.”131
The Government argued that the unregulated “indecent” and “patently offensive”
content on the Internet was “driving countless citizens away from the medium
122

Id. at 866-70.

123

See id. at 867.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

See id. at 868. The Court also addressed the Government’s argument that the precedent
of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. should apply. Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475
U.S. 41 (1986). In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult movie
theatres in residential neighborhoods. Renton, 475 U.S. at 53. In Reno, the Government
attempted to argue that the CDA was a “cyberzoning” ordinance of the Internet. Reno, 521
U.S. at 868. Justice Stevens concluded that Renton did not apply because the CDA applied
too broadly to the entire universe of the Internet and that the CDA was a “content-based
blanket restriction on speech.” Id.
127

Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70.

128

Id. at 867, 869.

129

Id. at 869-70.

130

Id. at 870.

131

Id. at 885.
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because of the risk of exposing themselves or their children to harmful material.”132
The Court discounted this argument by noting the “phenomenal” growth of the
Internet and “governmental regulation of the content of speech is more likely to
interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”133 Justice Stevens
concluded the opinion with the following comprehensive statement: “The interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical
but unproven benefit of censorship.”134
The Court, through the precedents discussed above, has set forth various tests and
approaches to determine the government’s ability to regulate speech and content
disseminated via the gamut of communication media. Whether a statute allows
regulation135 or the First Amendment disallows regulation,136 the Court has shown its
reluctance to push new communication technologies into the regulatory scope of
FCC authority.137 The following discussion will analyze and compare wireless
broadband transmissions with other communication technologies to determine if the
FCC has the authority to regulate these transmissions by means of traditional
broadcasts.
III. APPLYING THE REGULATORY SCOPE OF FCC AUTHORITY TO NEW
COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
A. An Analysis of Wireless Broadband Transmissions with a Comparison to
Traditional Broadcast Transmissions
1. A Statutory Approach
The anti-indecency media group Morality in Media, Inc. contends that if a signal
is transmitted over radio airwaves, then it is a broadcast and therefore subject to the
indecency standards set forth in § 1464.138 Logically, this makes complete sense.
Legally, however, this is not how the law regulating wireless transmissions is
designed.139 In 1993, Congress created the statutory classification that wireless
broadband transmissions are “commercial mobile radio services” (CMRS).140
Furthermore, § 1464 and this line of statutes are not applicable to CMRS.141 Thus,
132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

See supra text accompanying notes 31-82.

136

See supra text accompanying notes 92-134.

137

See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Reno, 521
U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996);
Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
138

See Rockwell, supra note 1.

139

See 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-20 (2005).

140

See 47 C.F.R. § 20.9(10) (2005).

141

See 47 C.F.R. § 20.15 (2005).
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the FCC possesses no statutory authority to regulate the content of wireless
broadband transmissions under the indecency standards of § 1464.142
If current statutory law does not regulate the content of wireless broadband
transmissions, then in order for the government to have the authority to regulate such
content, Congress will need to draft new legislation. Any power granted to the FCC
by Congressional legislation, if challenged, must ultimately pass the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment scrutiny to be enforceable.143 The following discussion
will apply the tests set forth by the Supreme Court as described in Part II of this
Note.
2. The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Content Prohibitions of Wireless Broadband
Transmissions
To determine the constitutionality of a law regulating the content of a new
medium of communication, the Court will use the medium-specific approach and
consider the invasiveness of the medium.144 Assuming, arguendo, the accessibility
and use of wireless broadband transmissions as a medium of communication is most
similar to the Internet, then the holding of Reno v. ACLU should apply.145 In Reno,
the Court relied on the invasiveness arguments of Sable to distinguish the Internet
from radio and television.146 Applying the analysis set forth by Justice White in
Sable to wireless broadband transmissions should yield the same result as both Sable
and Reno: (1) The listener (broadband user) must take affirmative steps to receive the
communication; (2) there is no captive audience or unwilling listener (broadband
user); (3) a caller (broadband user) seeks and is willing to pay for the
communication; and (4) a telephone call (broadband connection to the Internet) is
not the same as turning on a radio.147 If broadband transmissions to wireless devices
and the Internet are equivalent media of communication, then Justice Stevens’
pointed statement from Reno holds true: “[T]he Internet is not as invasive as radio or
television.”148
142

See supra note 139.

143

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

144

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms.
Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492
U.S. 115 (1989); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
145

Broadband transmissions are essentially data transmissions over specific radio
frequencies that have the ability to send extremely large amounts of data. See JIANGZHOU
WANG, BROADBAND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS: 3G, 4G, AND WIRELESS LAN ch. 1 (2001),
available at http://www.netlibrary.com. These large amounts of data enable the user to
transmit and receive high quality video and audio comparable to home Internet use. See id.
The main benefit of broadband technology is that it allows users of hand-held devices to
directly access and fully browse the Internet without sacrificing viewing quality. See id.
Therefore, I argue the content transmitted over wireless broadband technology is equivalent to
the Internet, and the ruling of Reno v. ACLU should apply to this medium.
146

Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70.

147

Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.

148

Reno, 521 U.S. at 869.
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In addition to determining the invasiveness of a medium, the Court will consider
the government’s history of regulating the medium.149 As Justice Stevens found in
Reno, the Internet “has no comparable history” to that of radio.150 The FCC’s
lengthy history of regulating the content of traditional broadcasts coupled with the
“scarcity of available frequencies” and the “invasive nature” of broadcasting has
provided a lower level of First Amendment scrutiny applicable to those traditional
broadcasts.151 Thus, with no history of FCC content regulation of wireless
broadband transmissions, the Court may apply strict scrutiny when reviewing the
provisions of a law regulating the content of wireless broadband transmissions as it
applies to the First Amendment.152
The government’s interest in protecting a child’s “psychological well-being” is
an accepted concept the Court utilizes when evaluating the constitutionality of a law
that regulates speech.153 However, the Court will not allow a total ban on protected
First Amendment speech in order to protect a child from whatever perceived harm
the speech may cause.154 As with the Internet in Reno, a law banning the indecent
content of wireless broadband transmissions would “reduce the adult population . . .
to . . . only what is fit for children.”155 Therefore, relying on the precedent laid down
in Reno, Sable, Pacifica, and Erznoznik, justification exists for the Court to strike
down a law regulating the content of broadband wireless transmissions for violating
the First Amendment under a standard of strict scrutiny.
B. A Comparison of Wireless Broadband Technology with Other New
Communication Technologies
1. Cable Television
The one medium of communication that bears a remarkable similarity to the
broadcast medium is cable television. The Court extended the rule in Pacifica to
cable television in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v
FCC.156 In Denver, the Court held cable television to the lower standard of First
Amendment protection that, until then, was uniquely afforded to broadcasting.157
The plurality concluded that all of the factors of Pacifica, such as invasiveness,
accessibility to children, and ineffectiveness of warnings, also applied to cable
149

Id. at 867.

150

Id.

151

Id. at 868.

152

Id. at 867-68.

153

See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).

154

See Reno, 521 U.S. at 869-70.

155

Sable, 492 U.S. at 128 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73
(1983).
156

Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 743-47 (1996).

157

Id. at 744.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2007

19

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

418

[Vol. 54:399

television.158 This conclusion increased doubts as to whether the narrow holding in
Pacifica applied only to broadcasting.159
Five short years later, the Court changed its mind in United States v. Playboy
Entertainment Group which was a decision that granted cable television full First
Amendment protection.160 In rejecting the application of a lower standard of First
Amendment review for cable television, which is closely related to broadcast
television, it appears the Court has “foreclose[d] the possibility that Pacifica will
have any applicability to . . . any other medium outside of broadcasting.”161
2. Satellite Radio and Television
Satellite radio and television also escape FCC indecency regulation for many of
the same reasons that cable television is not subject to indecency regulation.
Primarily, users of this medium must subscribe to and pay for the service.162 For
example, the FCC denied a petition from an FM radio station to apply the indecency
standards of § 1464 to satellite radio because the statute does not apply to “services
lacking the indiscriminate access to children that characterizes broadcasting.”163
Thus, those who subscribe to satellite radio or television affirmatively choose to have
the content transmitted into their home or vehicle, thereby negating the argument in
Pacifica that the medium invades an individual’s home.164
3. A Comparison
Wireless broadband transmissions possess many similarities to the above
technologies, but also one important difference. Like cable and satellite, wireless
broadband is a pay service. It is a pay service that enables the user to connect
directly to the Internet, which has survived its own challenges of government
regulation as mentioned above.165 The FCC possesses no authority to regulate
wireless broadband because 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.1-20 do not treat these transmissions as
a broadcast medium.166 This is where the one difference of wireless broadband as
compared to the other technologies exists: Radio frequencies transmit wireless
158

Id. at 744-45.

159

FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978).

160

United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 811-14 (2000).

161

Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the
First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 301 (2003).
162

Adam Thierer, New Worlds to Censor, WASH. POST, June 7, 2005, at A23.

163

Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be Extended to Cable
Television and Satellite Radio?, PROGRESS ON POINT (Progress & Freedom Found., Wash.,
D.C.) May 2005, at 5, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop12.8indecency.pdf (citing
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broadband information.167 Congress possesses the power to write new statutes168 that
could pull these frequencies into the broadcast realm and thereby rendering them
subject to indecency standards.169 However, strict scrutiny would apply to these new
statutes under a First Amendment challenge.170
Currently, the FCC does not regulate transmitted indecency on any of the
aforementioned media. The various industries related to these media have employed
self-regulation as a means of controlling the amount of or access to indecency.171
Recently, the cable and satellite industries took a major step regarding selfregulatory measures. The cable and satellite industries have announced that they will
be offering “family-tier” program packages to subscribers of their respective
services.172 Pressure from anti-indecency media groups, Congress, and the FCC
prompted these industries to offer these packages.173
The wireless industry, represented by the Cellular Telecommunications and
Internet Association (CTIA), released its own set of guidelines to help inform the
public of the type of content that is available through a carrier’s service.174 These
guidelines do not apply to any content accessible through the Internet.175 These
guidelines apply only to the content offered by the carrier.176 Similar to the cable and
satellite industry, the wireless industry proposed these guidelines in order to stave off
attempts by the government and anti-indecency groups to initiate FCC regulation of
their medium.177
IV. THE POLITICS OF FCC INDECENCY REGULATION
A. Various Anti-Indecency Media Groups and their Influence on FCC Policy
There are those who wish for the content regulation of wireless transmissions and
those who do not. Regardless of the position taken, those opposing sides will
attempt to influence the FCC and Congress to further their agenda through various
167

See supra note 145.

168
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See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000).
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See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, (2000); Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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See, e.g., Glen Garvin, Horror Episode Too Graphic for Edgy Showtime Series, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 21, 2006, available at http://www.montereyherald.com/mld/Miamiherald
entertainment/television/13676679.htm?source=rss&channel=miamiherald_television.
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methods. The following discussion briefly introduces some of the factions involved
on both sides of the debate.
1. Morality in Media, Inc.
Founded in 1968 by Father Morton A. Hill, Morality in Media, Inc. (MIM) states
that its mission is “to address two pressing moral and cultural [evils]: (1) The
exploitation of obscenity in the marketplace; and (2) The erosion of decency
standards in the media.”178 MIM attempts to accomplish this mission by lobbying
elected government officials, lobbying members of the FCC, filing complaints with
the FCC, and promoting its philosophy to the public through its website and legal
center.179 MIM operates the National Obscenity Law Center in New York City that it
founded in 1976.180 The appointment to a pair of indecency commissions by
Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan is an example of Father Hill’s and
MIM’s access to the government regarding indecency policy.181
The networking, organization, and resources that MIM possesses have
continually placed them at the forefront of the fight against indecency in America.182
MIM excels at using its knowledge of the law to try to influence government and
FCC policy on indecency.183 Although MIM makes many headlines and has direct
contact with numerous lawmakers and FCC officials,184 their attempt to regulate and
abolish indecency in the media has waned185 as it is in direct conflict with the
Supreme Court’s First Amendment precedent.186 Thus, only a change in the
Supreme Court’s application of the First Amendment to different media of
communication will enable MIM to accomplish its goals.
178
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hyperlink).
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from a member of MIM’s national planning board. Id. at 68-69. MIM also submitted an
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Philadelphia on how to prepare one of the complaints” to the FCC that initiated the three April
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2. The American Family Association
Don Wildmon founded the American Family Association (AFA) in 1977 to
promote “family values” and to educate people “on the influence of television and
other media - including pornography - on our society.”187 AFA claims to have nearly
three million supporters,188 and its primary tactic against indecency is the economic
boycott.189 Through these boycotts, the AFA has had more success against
individual companies than they have had in changing indecency policy within the
FCC.190 Consequently, the AFA has received many headlines comparable to those of
MIM,191 but likewise, the AFA has been unable to make significant changes to the
FCC’s regulation of indecency.192
3. Similar Groups and the FCC’s Reactions to them
Other groups with a similar agenda to that of MIM and AFA are the Parents
Television Council (PTC) and Concerned Women for America (CWA).193 The
president of the PTC, Brent Bozell, believes any self-regulation by the entertainment
industry is flawed because the industry downplays what is indecent for the sake of
advertising dollars.194 Mr. Bozell therefore believes the device known as the “Vchip”195 is flawed because it blocks programming that is deemed indecent by the
187
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188

Id.

189

See ZARKIN, supra note 25, at 81.

190
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note 25, at 77-78 (citing Saturday Ticker, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Oct. 21, 1989, Business 8). AFA
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E1; Marla Dickerson, Christian Group Escalates Boycott Against Disney, L.A. TIMES, July 2,
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AND CONST., Mar. 7, 1998, at O1; Groups Join Baptists Boycott of Disney, ADVOCATE, July
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network studios, not the FCC.196 As a result, the PTC, along with the CWA, lobbied
the FCC and Congress to promote the idea of the “family-friendly programming
packages.”197 Although Congress and the FCC did not mandate the availability of
the family tier,198 for several years the FCC steadily pressured the cable and satellite
industry to provide this option to its subscribers.199 In January of 2006, the three
largest cable television companies and the two primary satellite television providers
announced they would be providing a family-friendly tier package for users of their
respective services.200
While self-regulatory measures appear to be making progress, FCC indecency
sanctions have declined. The year 2004 produced record fines imposed by the FCC
of $7.9 million for broadcast indecency violations, whereas the FCC did not issue
any fines for indecency violations in the year 2005.201 This fact prompted statements
from the PTC expressing disappointment in the FCC’s enforcement of broadcast
indecency.202 The PTC believes that the inaction by the FCC may encourage
broadcasters to air indecent content on television without the fear of fines imposed
by the FCC.203 In response, the FCC states it will act soon on pending complaints.204
Additionally, the FCC hired a former board member of the CWA as a special advisor
in the Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis.205 This move may usher in a
new era of indecency regulation and now provides the anti-indecency media groups
with an insider as a member of the FCC hierarchy.
Despite these various groups’ successes and failures to influence and change
FCC indecency policy, corporate America may wield even greater power than the
aforementioned groups.
regulation as opposed to the FCC regulating network programming. John Eggerton, FCC
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B. Corporate America’s Influence on FCC Policy
The anti-indecency media groups’ specific agenda is to abolish indecency in
broadcasting, while corporate America’s only agenda is to make money.
Corporations truly do not possess a profound interest in whether a First Amendment
violation occurs. In order for corporate America to succeed with its agenda, it must
prevent government regulation of its respective industries as much as possible.
Establishing self-regulatory measures is one method to keep the government from
regulating one’s industry.206 Another common and effective method is to lobby
Congress and the FCC.207
Whoever possesses the most money usually lobbies most effectively.208
Compared to the anti-indecency media groups, the enormous corporations involved
in the cable, telecommunications, and Internet industries clearly have the ability to
spend more time and money lobbying Congress and the FCC. To illustrate, the
telephone and cable companies are currently attempting to lobby Congress to weaken
communication laws in order to operate and control the Internet more like a private
network.209 This may allow for unregulated content on the Internet, but it will also
limit who may partake in placing content on the Internet or who may access this
content.210 If there is too much regulation, then ideas are suppressed. If there is too
little regulation, then major corporations may determine which ideas are viewed.211
Internet accessibility may ultimately be determined according to how Congress
chooses to regulate the Internet’s access network, either by keeping it neutral or
making it private.212 Accordingly, this decision will directly affect both commerce
and the freedom of speech.
V. THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF WIRELESS CONTENT REGULATION BY THE FCC
The regulation of wireless content by the FCC through a traditional broadcast
lens will have a tremendous chilling effect on free speech and commerce in the
United States. The Supreme Court, the FCC, the anti-indecency groups, and
corporate America each have an objective to secure in addressing the issue of
206
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wireless content regulation. Finding a solution that appeases all parties without
stifling free speech or commerce is presumably unattainable.
A. The Effect on the Freedom of Speech
To regulate the content of wireless broadband transmissions is to regulate content
on the Internet.213 The predominant use of wireless broadband is to connect to the
Internet through handheld devices. The CTIA estimates the number of wireless
subscribers in the United States at 242 million.214 The Internet has become and
continues to progress as the primary global communication medium. Thus,
regulating the content of wireless broadband transmissions is an indirect method of
regulating content on the Internet.215
In Reno, the Court struck down a law that regulated indecent content on the
Internet.216 The Court stated that a “content-based regulation of speech . . . raises
special First Amendment concerns because of its obvious chilling effect on free
speech.”217 Wireless and Internet media essentially have the ability to transmit all
forms of communication, including telephone, newspapers, magazines, television,
music, movies, photographs, etc. By regulating wireless transmissions to protect
minors, the government would be regulating all media of communication, thereby
suppressing “a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to
receive and to address to one another.”218
The enactment of a law regulating the indecent content of wireless broadband
transmissions would create a precedent that could extend regulation to other, if not
all, media of communication. The First Amendment freedom of speech cannot be
placed upon this slippery slope. The fundamental right of freedom of speech
maintains our democratic society by allowing every individual to express his or her
thoughts, beliefs, and values irrespective of any other individual’s approval or
agreement with those expressions.
The unlimited communication capabilities of wireless broadband and the Internet
“can hardly be considered a scarce expressive commodity.”219 As the Court in Reno
noted, “the content on the Internet is as diverse as human thought.”220 The Court
continued: “In evaluating the free speech rights of adults, we have made it perfectly
clear that ‘[s]exual expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the
First Amendment.’”221 If strict scrutiny does not apply to any law attempting to
regulate the content of wireless broadband transmissions, then Americans’ speech
213
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may be reduced to what the government construes to be appropriate and decent. The
Court has recognized that ‘“regardless of the strength of the government’s interest’
in protecting children, ‘[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox [or handheld
wireless device] simply cannot be limited to that which would be suitable for a
sandbox.’”222
B. The Effect on Commerce
FCC regulation of wireless broadband content would have an economic effect on
every type of entity and organization from government and business to the
individual. Decisions made by the FCC and Congress regarding regulation of this
expanding technology are critical. Not only is there the obvious loss of money if
regulation ensues, but the competitiveness of the United States in the global
economy is at stake.223
The United States government stands to gain an immediate financial windfall
based on the demand for wireless broadband. The FCC is scheduled to begin the
sale of wireless licenses on June 29, 2006 and continue to do so through 2009.224
The Bush Administration projects to raise $25 billion from the sale of licenses.225 In
the long term, no one has projected the possible tax revenue generated from the tens
of millions of future users of wireless broadband, let alone the tax revenue from the
commerce conducted over these networks. The regulation of content on wireless
broadband does not appear to be in the best financial interest of the government.
When the FCC addresses wireless broadband issues, it has conflicting internal
goals. The FCC’s chief, Kevin Martin, believes “[i]t is critical that consumers have
unfettered access to the Internet and all the services it provides.”226 Mr. Martin also
stated in a recent interview that “[t]he changes that are occurring in
telecommunications today are affecting every aspect of the way people are
interacting.”227 He argued that “getting affordable broadband service to every
household must be the commission’s top priority.”228 Finally, he noted that “we’re
going to see quite dramatic changes, but what’s critical for all of those changes is
increasing connections, increasing connection speeds and making sure it’s
ubiquitously and affordably done for everyone in the country. And increasingly that
222
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it’s even done wirelessly.”229 However, Mr. Martin and the FCC still have to answer
to requests for increasing indecency regulation that directly opposes the expansion of
wireless broadband. To address these indecency matters Mr. Martin states his “goal
is to make sure the concerns of parents get addressed, and I’ve always thought
there’s a variety of ways that we could end up doing that.”230 Without stating the
specific ways, it appears Mr. Martin and the FCC will focus on wireless expansion,
and then address the indecency concerns.
The businesses that are in position to capitalize on the growth of wireless
broadband include those who will provide the access, those who will make the
devices, and those who will provide the content. In order for the government to
receive $25 billion for the sale of licenses, it is obvious that large access providers
must be willing to pay for these licenses.231 In addition to access costs to the wireless
broadband network, users may need to pay for content, which is unlike traditional
Internet use.232 The pay-for-content aspect of wireless broadband may be a new
source of revenue for traditional media companies.233 Therefore, the regulation of
wireless broadband content will adversely affect consumer demand for wireless use
and result in reduced revenue for the government and business as well as investment
in the technology.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under current statute and application of Supreme Court precedent and methods
of analysis, the FCC has no authority to extend traditional broadcast indecency
regulations to wireless broadband content. The Supreme Court has not applied the
rule set forth in Pacifica to media of communication other than traditional broadcast
radio and television. As technology continues to integrate media of communication,
the line between traditional broadcast and other media will continue to blur.
Possibly, this line will blur to a point where there will be no line and only wireless
broadband communications exist. If that occurs, Pacifica may have no place in
indecency analysis. Conversely, Pacifica may be revived and control indecency
analysis if there exists only one primary medium of communication.
To regulate wireless broadband in its infancy as the anti-indecency groups desire
will impede the growth of this technology and infringe upon the First Amendment
rights of all Americans. The United States must be able to compete globally with
this emergent technology. Consequently, Congress and the FCC must strike a
delicate balance in fostering and cultivating wireless broadband. On one hand, the
Supreme Court must protect the First Amendment rights of Americans from
overreaching regulation. On the other hand, the current policy of deregulation
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use has declined in recent years because of cable and the Internet. Id.
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among communication companies presents its own set of harms to avoid. “The
problems of regulation are rendered more difficult because the broadcast industry is
dynamic in terms of technological change; solutions adequate a decade ago are not
necessarily so now, and those acceptable today may well be outmoded 10 years
hence.”234 Perhaps Justice Burger’s foreshadowing statement places the issue in
perspective.
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